KGB of the USSR. 1954–1991 Secrets of the death of the Great Power Oleg Maksimovich Khlobustov

The last chairman of the KGB of the USSR

The last chairman of the KGB of the USSR

Actually last Chairman of the KGB of the USSR in 1988–1991 years became Vladimir Alexandrovich Kryuchkov.

During the 23 months of Kryuchkov’s tenure as chairman of the KGB of the USSR, many dramatic events occurred in the history of our country, the apotheosis of which was the death of the Great Power - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Like Chebrikov and Fedorchuk, Kryuchkov was a leader Andropov school, but, apparently, did not possess his intellectual, business and strong-willed qualities.

The head of the PGU Kryuchkov was appointed to the position of chairman of the KGB in connection with the election of V.M. Chebrikova Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee by a joint resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on October 1, 1988.

According to established tradition, even earlier, on September 20, 1989, V.A. Kryuchkov was also elected a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee - Politburo of the Central Committee and personally General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev remained the main recipients of information from the KGB of the USSR.

In accordance with the ongoing reforms of government and administrative bodies, after the formation of the new convocation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the appointments of Union ministers, including chairmen of state committees and other departments, were made by him in July 1989.

Statement of V.A. Kryuchkov as Chairman of the KGB of the USSR - his candidacy was supported and proposed for approval by the Committee on Defense and State Security of the USSR - at a meeting of the Supreme Council was accompanied by his report on the main directions and tasks of the activities of state security agencies. This report also became a kind of report on the work of the KGB before the highest legislative body of the country, which marked the beginning of parliamentary control over the state of state security of the country.

It should be especially emphasized that for a number of reasons, which will be discussed below, in Soviet society at the end of the 80s of the last century there was an inadequate understanding of the history, purpose and content of the activities of domestic state security bodies, which was reflected directly in speeches of KGB leaders, as well as in questions asked to them in various audiences.

For objective coverage of the entire range of problems of ensuring state security, as the national security of the USSR was then called, the leadership of the State Security Committee decided to more actively, regularly and systematically inform the population about the activities of the KGB, explaining both the features of the current situation in the country and in the world, and the tasks the solution of which is entrusted to the KGB, and the contribution of the security agencies to the solution of various problems facing the state.

As noted in the editorial preface to the collection "KGB facing the people"(Moscow, 1990), the content and essence of the activities of the security agencies in the conditions of perestroika were actively discussed not only in the KGB groups - and this is the absolute truth, I testify to this as an eyewitness and contemporary - but also by people's deputies, executive authorities, representatives of various public organizations and the media.

This collection of interviews and speeches by the chairman of the KGB of the USSR and his deputies was prepared to objectively inform the people's deputies of the USSR and the RSFSR on the entire range of issues of the activities of the KGB bodies, and then it was planned to publish it in mass circulation. The last project was not destined to come true. Due to its small circulation of 1 thousand copies and the targeted nature of the publication, this collection, which has now become a bibliographic rarity, is still a valuable source of information for historians today about the activities of the KGB bodies in 1985–1991.

However, let us immediately make a reservation that all the speeches of V.A. included in this collection. Kryuchkov were later included in his book “Without a Statute of Limitations” (M., 2006).

It should also be noted that great importance for truthful and objective coverage of the activities of security agencies there was also adoption and implementation decision of the KGB Board of April 21, 1989 “On the development of transparency in the activities of the bodies and troops of the KGB of the USSR.”

This decision was dictated both by the growing interest of the population in the activities of state security agencies, and as a consequence of the change in the information situation in the country, as well as attempts inspired from abroad to discredit the KGB bodies. The desire to discredit state security agencies has always been inherent in ideological sabotage against the USSR, because foreign political strategists understood perfectly well that undermining the population’s trust in the KGB, weakening the state structure designed to protect the public and state interests of the country, would create more favorable conditions for the activities of its geopolitical competitors , implementation of their plans and intentions.

As rightly noted by the deputy head of the VGU KGB of the USSR, General A.A. Fabrichnikov, “glasnost in all its manifestations and various combinations with forms, methods and techniques of secret warfare was previously and is today in the arsenal of all counterintelligence services in the world.” Emphasizing that “there is every reason to consider Glasnost as one of the most important socio-political principles of the activities of Soviet counterintelligence, which, along with other socio-political principles, ensures high efficiency of counterintelligence activities.”

On December 1, 1987, the issue of expanding openness in the activities of the KGB was considered at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

In the previous meeting KGB note to the CPSU Central Committee dated November 24, 1987, in particular, it was noted:

“The State Security Committee of the USSR, in restructuring its activities, pays great attention to measures aimed at increasing the role of the KGB in implementing the party’s goals for the comprehensive development of socialist democracy. Of great importance in this process are the expansion of openness in matters of ensuring the state security of Russia, a deep understanding among broad circles of the Soviet public of the goals and objectives of the KGB, and the active participation of workers in protecting against the subversive machinations of opponents of the revolutionary process of perestroika.

The work of the KGB agencies to uncover the aspirations and suppress hostile actions of the enemy is quite noticeably reflected in the media. However... the demands of today put before the State Security Committee the task of further expanding transparency in its activities.

In this regard, it was considered advisable to implement a number of additional measures, which, in the opinion of the KGB of the USSR, would contribute to expanding transparency in the activities of the KGB bodies, strengthening their ties with workers and would have important preventive and preventive significance.”

The note also noted that “Glasnost is one of the main forms of active communication between state security agencies and workers. But today Our fellow citizens do not know everything they should know about state security agencies. It happens that information from the KGB does not keep up with events, sometimes sweeping criticism and sometimes malicious attacks against the KGB go unanswered.

...specific measures to promote transparency in activities The KGB of the USSR is aimed at creating a system of constant and comprehensive information to society, which is one of the defining guarantees of strengthening ties with workers, compliance with socialist legality, and constitutional obligations.

Today, in covering the activities of the State Security Committee, there are essentially no taboo topics, with the exception of quite understandable restrictions arising from the requirements of secrecy.

... topical issues are increasingly reflected in the media - the participation of the KGB in the fight against organized crime, interaction in this matter with the prosecutor's office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and customs officials.

Glasnost concerns not only the present, but also the past, it requires its objective analysis, further measures to eliminate the consequences of violations of Leninist principles in the activities of the security agencies during the period of the cult of personalities...”

The intensification of this area of ​​activity led not only to the reorganization of the Press Bureau of the KGB of the USSR, on the basis of which the Center for Public Relations (CPR) was formed, but also prompted the search and approval of qualitatively new approaches to interaction with the media.

The practice of the CSO bodies began to include holding a press conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet Press Agency "Novosti" (APN), meetings with foreign correspondents.

It is also becoming traditional for territorial KGB departments to conduct interviews with their leaders, round table meetings, and broadcast “live” on radio and television.

The museums and rooms of the glory of the KGB departments opened their doors to visitors____.

In addition, publications of declassified documents also began to appear, including those from the KGB of the USSR, articles, collections, studies and documentary journalistic publications prepared on their basis, which became very numerous in 1988–1990. In particular, they were regularly published in the socio-political bulletin “Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU”, in the newspapers “Pravda”, “Glasnost”, “Military Historical Journal” and other publications.

A significant contribution to the expansion of relations between journalists and representatives of the KGB bodies was made by the former head of the press service of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region, and subsequently of the Public Relations Center (CSR) of the MB-FSK-FSB, now retired Major General A.G. Mikhailov, as well as Lieutenant General A.A., who replaced him. Zdanovich.

Speech by V.A. Kryuchkov at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on July 14, 1989 was broadcast on Central Television, and later his transcript was published in the newspaper “Soviet Russia”, as a result of which a multimillion-dollar audience and readership in our country could become acquainted with him.

In his report to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kryuchkov also described the work KGB foreign intelligence:“The main task of intelligence activities is to contribute in every possible way to ensuring peace, strengthening the security of the Soviet state, its foreign policy positions and interests.”

Somewhat later, specifying the activities of the PGU, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR in an interview with a correspondent of the weekly newspaper “Novoe Vremya” noted:

“The very fact that we are participating in the development of certain foreign policy problems requires us to be responsible and indicates that we are taken into account. In general, I must say that there is no country where intelligence is not taken into account. Sometimes we initiate certain steps in the field of foreign policy. However, in my opinion, in this area we have one organization - a trendsetter - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs...

The task of intelligence is to provide the country’s leaders with objective information so that they can make the best decision.”

V.A. Kryuchkov also clarified that the KGB “must receive and communicate (to senior authorities - O.Kh.) objective information, I emphasize - objective, if possible proactive” (“Novoye Vremya”, 1989, No. 32).

At that time, Soviet intelligence already knew that October 30, 1988 US CIA Director W. Webster emphasized that “The work carried out against the USSR will remain the main focus of the CIA’s activities in collecting and analyzing information in the 90s. The Soviet Union's military capabilities, efforts to expand its global influence, and active intelligence activities continue to pose a threat to the security of the United States." And regarding “perestroika,” he noted that the United States “must pay closer attention to the processes and political struggle in the Soviet Union.”

To implement this task, a special Perestroika Progress Center was created in the US intelligence community in 1989, which included representatives of the CIA, DIA and the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research.

Intelligence reports on the situation in the USSR prepared by the Center were reported daily personally to President George W. Bush and other members of the US National Security Council.

At the direction of George W. Bush, annual appropriations for human intelligence alone have increased by more than 20% since 1989.

It is clear that achieve precisely proactive information was not always possible. Because the KGB, like any other intelligence agency in the world, worked in a confrontation with a real and strong enemy represented by the intelligence coalition of NATO countries, seeking to both hide and disguise their true goals and intentions, and conduct special disinformation and diversionary campaigns and activities.

These circumstances explain the occurrences failures and failures in the activities of the intelligence services, including the KGB of the USSR.

It seems interesting to compare Soviet and American conceptual views on the purpose and role of intelligence in the mechanism of government.

In this regard, we note that in a keynote speech in the US Congress, Robert Gates, who became director of the CIA in the George W. Bush administration, stated that “Intelligence is becoming an increasingly central factor in the formation of American foreign policy... The most important thing is that the role of intelligence is increasing as the only organization in the American administration that looks forward, one might say, “scouts the future.” Intelligence is far ahead of other US agencies in assessing and identifying the problems that the US will face in 5-10 years and even in the 21st century.”

In a speech at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, candidate for the post of chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov emphasized that “one of the main activities of the state security agencies is counterintelligence, that is, the protection of our interests and secrets.”

The term “national interests” itself had not yet been uttered, but it was specifically about protecting interests of the Soviet Union, the interests of the peoples inhabiting it, in Western political terminology - the national interests of the country.

And later, answering numerous questions from deputies - a total of 96 questions were asked to him during the meeting - V.A. Kryuchkov added:

What is happening in our country is of great interest to the special services of Western countries, some other countries, and especially all kinds of organizations that often take anti-socialist, anti-Soviet positions. We feel this from the propaganda, from the arrival of their emissaries here, from the literature that they bring here. There is another direction, the so-called Islamic fundamentalist. This is a very dangerous thing, given the fanaticism and indiscriminateness in methods and means. It seems that this is a question of state security agencies, and legal authorities, and our organizations engaged in propaganda work...

Of course, those on the other side are not inactive, they are trying to actively influence the state of affairs in our country. But, comrades, let's look for reasons first of all in our own home, in ourselves. Look for reasons within ourselves, where we once did something wrong... I, as the chairman of the KGB, as a former intelligence chief, can say that they are not inactive there. We see it. It seems to them that the Soviet Union, when it looks like a powerful factor, is one situation that is unfavorable for them. And the Soviet Union as a weakened factor is another situation that is beneficial for them. Although there are sober people there who understand that this is far from true.”

As the events of subsequent years showed, these words turned out to be prophetic in the full sense of the word.

Such a detailed reproduction of some of the speeches of that a time already far from us, in our opinion, it is necessary in order to show what the KGB of the USSR knew at that time, what it informed the political leadership of the country about, what decisions were made based on this information.

Because, as we know, history tends to repeat itself...

At the same meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in July 1989, Kryuchkov was also first stated that The KGB is fighting terrorism, including international terrorism. Although, until the mid-90s, this topic seemed irrelevant not only to the general audience, but also to the majority of political figures of that era.

But the security officers already then really realized, felt this threat and were actively preparing to repel it, and It is not their fault that in less than 15 months the KGB will fall victim to political intrigue and confrontation. And the victims of these hidden intrigues and political confrontations will be the security and population of our Motherland, its genuine rights and freedoms, and national interests.

On the issue of the essence of perestroika in the activities of state security agencies KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov explained:

We believe that qualitatively new principles of the relationship between state and security should be formulated and implemented. It is not the interests of society and the state that should adapt to the activities of state security agencies and their special services, but, on the contrary, the KGB bodies and their services must strictly submit to the interests of society and the state and proceed from them.

In the course of answering numerous questions from deputies, Kryuchkov explained that the scope of activity of state security bodies is determined, in particular, by the criminal and criminal procedural legislation of the USSR and union republics - Article 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR of 1960 and the corresponding articles of the criminal procedural codes of the union republics of the USSR .

Let us immediately emphasize that, in connection with the reorganization of the public administration system in the USSR in 1989, the right to control the activities of the KGB, in addition to the CPSU Central Committee, was also granted to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, both directly and through its Committee on Defense and State Security , as well as the Constitutional Oversight Committee, which were truly extremely important legal innovations.

Speaking about the priorities, main directions and principles of restructuring in the work of state security agencies, V.A. Kryuchkov defined them as Law, Truth and Glasnost.

The first of them was understood as improving the entire legal framework for both ensuring the security of the country and the activities of the KGB of the USSR.

Indeed, the absence of laws on counterintelligence and operational investigative activities made the situation stalemate and acutely raised the question of the legislative basis for the work of all law enforcement agencies, including the KGB.

The Committee on Defense and State Security of the USSR Armed Forces, together with the KGB, the Prosecutor General's Office and other government bodies, began work on preparing draft laws “On State Security”, “On Crimes against the State”, and on KGB bodies.

At the same time, it was assumed that the latter would reveal questions about the principles of activity, tasks and functions of the KGB, the place of the State Security Committee in the comprehensive security system of the Soviet Union, since many other ministries and departments took part in its implementation, relations with other government agencies and public organizations, as well as the rights and obligations of their employees, the procedure for appealing certain of their actions.

These plans were implemented in Law “On State Security Bodies in the USSR”, adopted by the Supreme Council on May 16, 1991.

On the issue of the participation of KGB bodies in the rehabilitation of victims of Stalinist repressions, which we will talk about in more detail later, the KGB chairman said:

This work means the need and even the need for a new generation of security officers, not involved in the tragic period of the past, to go through the pain of atrocities and losses suffered by the people, and even by the state security agencies themselves, to politically and emotionally survive the pain in order to never allow anything like this in the future.

Kryuchkov emphasized that “the most important guarantee against arbitrariness and violation of the legitimate rights and interests of citizens should be the implementation of the principles of democracy and transparency in all activities of state security agencies. Soviet people have the right to know about the activities and nature of the work of the KGB bodies. The authorities themselves are also interested in this, since this will help form an objective idea of ​​state security authorities, their duties, responsibilities and rights.

It is important to make permanent and effective connections between state security agencies and the public and labor collectives. In this case, you can count on the support of workers in solving problems of ensuring state security... This can only be done together with the people, relying on the public on a daily basis...”

The KGB chairman also pointed out to the people's deputies of the USSR the shortcomings in the work of his subordinates:

We often we don't deliver on time We have a rather sharp, principled assessment of the difficult situations that are brewing, but we do not show integrity and persistence in raising issues with local and even central authorities. They have an effect and are purely psychological barrier, timidity caused by a number of political, social events and circumstances... inability to discern negative, alarming aspects in the rapidly developing generally constructive processes. It is especially difficult in cases where we are talking about conflict situations on an interethnic basis when mass unrest occurs...

It should be noted that it was in the late 80s that mass unrest, including with the use of weapons, arose in a number of regions of the USSR. And it is in these conflicts that were not resolved in time that the reasons for many of the bloody clashes of 1991–1994 are rooted, which already took the form of armed conflicts of a non-international nature (internal armed conflicts, according to internationally accepted terminology), in the newly independent states - the former Union republics of the USSR.

The KGB leaders were asked many questions about the 5th Directorate.

Describing the activities of the 5th Directorate, the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov in an interview with the Izvestia newspaper on October 26, 1989, for the first time officially admitted that the state security agencies in the 70s - 80s identified and prevented more than 1,500 persons who were carrying out terrorist activities. intentions.

In the summer of 1989, in connection with changes occurring in the country, as well as changes in criminal legislation, a decision was made to abolish the 5th Directorate and create the USSR KGB Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System (Directorate “3”).

Legislative changes, in particular, concerned the disposition of Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of September 11, 1989, the legal norm on criminal liability for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda was abolished. Instead, in the same article 70 of the Criminal Code there was criminal liability has been established for calls for a violent change in the constitutional order.

In a note by the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov in the CPSU Central Committee to justify the need to abolish the 5th Directorate and create a new division on August 4, 1989, it was emphasized:

“In the conditions of the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society, the expansion of democratization and openness, special services of capitalist countries and associated foreign anti-Soviet centers and other organizations are transferring their subversive activities against the USSR to a new strategic and tactical platform.

In its goals and forms, it takes on the character of a struggle against the constitutional foundations of the USSR.

By reviving nationalism, chauvinism, and clericalism, Western intelligence services and anti-Soviet organizations are actively trying to inspire hotbeds of social tension, anti-Soviet manifestations and mass unrest, and incite hostile elements to actions aimed at the violent overthrow of Soviet power.

With particular persistence, they strive to form legal and illegal groups of an anti-constitutional nature, directly supervise them, provide material and ideological support, and incite extremist actions.”

At the same time, antisocial elements, “using some of the amateur formations brought to life by the political activity of citizens, hiding behind the slogans of democratization and renewal of Soviet society, they are working for anti-constitutional purposes to create structures opposition to the CPSU and other organizational formations. Their subversive activities using nationalism and chauvinism intensified especially sharply. In a number of places, groups and movements that have arisen on this basis openly preach violent methods of changing the social and state system of the USSR, organize mass riots, commit dangerous extremist actions, terrorist manifestations, and other acts of violence against officials and citizens, including the use of weapons.

The stated circumstances urgently require strengthening of work on the proper protection of the constitutional system of the union Soviet state, protecting Soviet society from the subversive activities of Western intelligence services, foreign anti-Soviet organizations and their like-minded people within the country...

In this regard, the operational activities of the newly created counterintelligence department are intended to be focused on solving the following main tasks:

Failure of the plans of special services of capitalist countries to create and use organizational anti-socialist groups for anti-constitutional purposes;

Suppressing the criminal activities of anti-socialist elements trying to violently overthrow Soviet power;

Prevention and suppression of terrorist acts;

Prevention and localization of mass riots and other illegal group actions of an extremist nature;

Identifying and neutralizing anti-Soviet nationalist manifestations."

According to the technology that existed at that time for making organizational and personnel decisions, the note of the KGB chairman on August 11 was considered by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and, based on its results, the draft corresponding Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (N 634–143 of August 13, 1989) was approved.

On this legal basis On August 29, 1989, order N00124 of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR was issued on the abolition of 5 management and education management “3” (Protection of the constitutional order).

As noted on this occasion by the First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Army General F.D. Bobkov, “it may seem strange, but for the first time in the entire history of the country, the state security agencies have been publicly and clearly entrusted with the task of protecting the constitutional order.” Listing the above tasks of the new department, F.D. Bobkov also mentioned the fight against organized crime. (“Motherland”, 1989, N 11).

E.F. was appointed head of Directorate “3” of the KGB of the USSR. Ivanov, and on January 30, 1990 he was replaced by V.P. Vorotnikov. Breaking the chronological order of presentation, we note that on September 25, 1991, by order of V.V. Bakatin, who became the chairman of the KGB, Vorotnikov was relieved of his post, and soon this department itself was liquidated.

Subsequently, the actual legal successors of Directorate “3” were first the Department for Combating Terrorism (UBT) of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation (1992–1993), and then the Department for the Protection of the Constitutional System and Combating Terrorism of the FSB of Russia.

But still, retrospectively assessing the activities of Directorate “3” of the KGB of the USSR from the standpoint of today, it should be objectively recognized that it did not fulfill many of the tasks assigned to it...

What, however, is the fault not only of its employees and leaders, but also, first of all, of the country’s political leadership, which showed inconsistency and indecisiveness both in protecting the Constitution of the country and upholding officially declared political course.

And also already decision taken at that time, but not officially declared M.S. Gorbachev about a different concept for the restructuring of Soviet society.

In our opinion, an important recognition of the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union is contained in the article of the former first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR F.D. Bobkov, published in January 2005 in the magazine “Life of Nationalities”.

In it he emphasized: "during the height of the Cold War" it was like war were not perceived. About her spoke and wrote only a limited circle of party lecturers, and leaders in their reports quoted the necessary excerpts for propaganda purposes. At the same time, no one warned about the danger of the Cold War for the state.

The KGB understood this danger and tried to the best of their ability not only to help the country’s leadership realize it, but also sought to convey the threat posed by the Cold War to the general public."

And again, turning to the reasons for the final collapse of the USSR, I will cite the opinion of F.D. on this matter. Bobkova:

“The leaders reveled or enjoyed power, discarding all information about threats from the outside, about processes in the country that could sow distrust in the authorities and disrupt stability in the state. Not only state leaders were affected by the “invincibility” virus. The disease has struck the community."

Genuine The cause of the collapse of the USSR was the notorious “human factor” - incompetence the then leadership of the country - which turned into a fatal “mistake of the crew” and the “ship’s captain.”

As noted on this occasion by the director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences S.M. Rogov, “the unprecedented decline of the 90s is the result not of the machinations of the CIA and the Pentagon, but of the incompetent and irresponsible policies of the then Russian leaders.”

And the American the strategy of “crushing a geopolitical rival” acted only as a background, an external factor, nevertheless - powerful factor who created real challenges and threats for the USSR, which Gorbachev’s leadership was powerless to resist.

However, few people have yet spoken seriously about the real reasons for the collapse of the Soviet state. But, due to the approaching twentieth anniversary(2011) “the beginning of the new history of Russia,” which means “the cessation of the existence of the USSR as a geopolitical reality,” there will undoubtedly be a serious conversation about this, as well as about the “social price,” the results and “the results achieved.”

As well as the fact that many unexpected discoveries and confessions await us here. But, I repeat, this matter is not yet so close future.

Another feature of the operational situation in the country at the end of the 80s of the last century was the growth of organized crime and the strengthening of its negative impact on the entire complex of socio-economic processes in the country.

In many speeches by the heads of state security agencies, it was noted that the growth and modification of crime in the country - it was then proudly emphasized that crime level(i.e. total number of registered in the country crimes), did not reach the level of leading capitalist states, but was characterized by trends of steady growth, which required both the expansion of the participation of the KGB in the fight against its most dangerous forms, and the adoption of appropriate political decisions and legislative acts.

This is how the president of the Russian Criminological Association A.I. Dolgova characterized the dynamics of changes in the crime situation in the country using the five-year average crime rate coefficient, that is, the number of registered crimes per 100 thousand residents of Russia:

1976–1980 - 664 reported crimes;

1981–1985 - "- 901;

1986–1990 - "- 982;

1991–1995 - "- 1,770.

Unfortunately, we have to admit that in subsequent years this growth continued in our country. objective criminological indicator.

Thus, according to the All-Russia Research Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2003, it was already 1,926 crimes per 100 thousand inhabitants, and adjusted for the number of adult (i.e., over 16 years old) citizens of the country - already 2,124.

Along with the general increase in the number of criminal acts in the late 80s, there was a growth and consolidation of organized crime, characterized by a higher level of criminal “professionalism”, scale of acts, organizational cohesion, secrecy, technical equipment, the presence of connections in administrative and economic management bodies, and also with foreign criminal groups.

The increase in crime in the country noted since the mid-80s, the aggravation of the crime situation at the turn of the 90s, required both certain organizational and staffing changes and appropriate legal regulation. And the basis for it was laid by the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 4, 1989 “On the decisive strengthening of the fight against crime.”

Another feature of the development of the crime situation in the country was the growth of economic crime, its merging with general criminal and violent crime, the formation of mafia-type criminal communities, which was accompanied by corruption of government officials who actually sided with serving criminal clans.

In one of his interviews, V.A. Kryuchkov noted that “we must act very energetically to restore order and destroy the causes that give rise to crime. This can be achieved in two ways: economic and financial measures; strengthening the fight against crime,” but, at the same time, “law enforcement agencies alone cannot solve this problem.”

Organized criminal groups both acquired international criminal connections, experience and “weight”, and became politicized and actively became involved in undermining the foundations of state power in the country.

According to law enforcement agencies, already in 1989 in the country about 700 criminal groups operated, and their annual turnover was more than 100 million rubles.

As V.A. noted later in his speech at the XYIII Congress of the CPSU. Kryuchkov, only based on materials from the KGB of the USSR only in 1989. Members of about 300 organized criminal groups were brought to criminal responsibility, illegally acquired currency and valuables worth more than 170 million rubles were converted into state income.

Despite the alarming warnings that were heard, they, unfortunately, were not heard and perceived properly, as a result of which, in subsequent years, organized crime burst into the “operational space.”

And a significant contribution to this was made by the hasty decisions of September 1991 to liquidate the 6th Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the “OP” Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

It should be noted that initially M.S. Gorbachev, as befits the leader of a Great Power, was attentive to information from state security agencies.

After cancellation March 14, 1990 Ill Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies Article 6 of the USSR Constitution “on the leading and guiding role of the CPSU in Soviet society”, KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov is quite rightly appointed as a member of the USSR Presidential Council, and after its reorganization on March 7, 1991, as a member of the USSR Security Council.

And here is what V.A. reported under the heading “Of Special Importance” (N 313 - K/OV dated February 14, 1990). Kryuchkov on the results of the operational and official activities of the KGB in 1989. To the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev:

“In all its activities, the State Security Committee was guided by the political line of the Communist Party, decisions of the highest authorities and resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. As part of the implementation of the foreign policy course of the Soviet state, the Committee directed its efforts to promoting the creation of a favorable climate in international relations, the formation of a comprehensive system of international security, disarmament, and expanding the scope of economic and humanitarian cooperation between states and peoples.

Along with the traditional areas of work on monitoring the military-strategic situation in the world, early detection of the preconditions for an enemy breakthrough in the military-technical field, the State Security Committee provided information about the plans and intentions of the ruling circles of the United States and its allies in connection with events in Eastern Europe and the development of internal political processes in our country.

The situation developing in Europe was carefully analyzed, in particular in the light of changes in German-German relations, the situation in NATO and the Warsaw War.

Significant adjustments were made to the work in the Afghan direction after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic of Afghanistan, in China, in connection with the normalization of relations with this country, as well as in Japan, South Korea and a number of other countries. The effectiveness of intelligence support for negotiations within the CSCE on nuclear and space disarmament has been increased. The fight against international terrorism, drug trafficking and smuggling has been intensified, and cooperation in these areas is being established with the intelligence services of capitalist states.

In solving internal political problems, the Committee focused on fully facilitating the perestroika processes and ensuring control over the situation in the country, destabilized by many unresolved issues in the economic and political fields. Particular attention was paid to monitoring the actions of nationalist, anti-socialist, extremist forces that entered the political arena, the localization of interethnic conflicts, separatist processes, anti-constitutional and other destructive manifestations.

Measures were consistently implemented to expand transparency in the activities of the Committee, bodies and troops of the KGB of the USSR.... The publication of an open information bulletin on the work of the KGB has been established. Politically, one of the leading places was occupied by the work on the rehabilitation of citizens who were unreasonably repressed during the 30-40s and early 50s. In 1989, the KGB took part in the rehabilitation of 838,630 citizens.

The dynamic development of the situation in the country and the world required the State Security Committee to intensify its work to provide information to the top leadership of the state, the government of the USSR and interested departments. A large number of notes and encrypted telegrams were sent to the authorities. Particular attention was paid to preparing materials for negotiations between Soviet leaders and leaders of the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, China and India and for the discussion of international and domestic problems by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

Great importance was attached to obtaining secret documentary materials from the governing bodies of capitalist states and their military-political blocs, including by intercepting and decrypting correspondence passing through various communication systems.

A number of large-scale active measures have been carried out in order to have a long-term beneficial impact on influential foreign circles, in solving key problems in the field of international security, nuclear, chemical and conventional disarmament, and in promoting the concept of a “common European home”.

A wide range of measures have been implemented to neutralize Western interference in the development of internal political processes in the USSR, to influence the positions of leaders and parliamentarians of a number of countries, in particular in their approaches to events in the Soviet Baltic republics...

Active measures in the economic field were aimed at strengthening cooperation between the USSR and leading developed countries, creating a favorable environment for Soviet exports, and gaining access to the latest technology. The actions taken had a certain positive impact on the approaches of the US administration and Congress to trade relations with the USSR, and on the decision of a number of countries to use Soviet space technology. Some measures made it possible to avoid large financial losses when concluding contracts and create favorable conditions for a number of important trade and economic transactions.

In the scientific and technical direction, the Committee's intelligence was able to obtain a number of samples and documentary materials urgently needed for the defense industries, to make a significant contribution to solving national economic problems, to accelerating fundamental and applied research, to the development of new equipment and technology...

The possibilities for conducting reconnaissance work from illegal positions and from the territory of the country have been expanded. Its quality and efficiency have improved somewhat.

The security of Soviet institutions and citizens abroad was ensured. A large number of provocative actions by enemy intelligence services, including those directed against intelligence officers, were thwarted. According to the KGB, 274 Soviet citizens were recalled from abroad ahead of schedule. It was not possible to prevent the non-return of 118 Soviet citizens to their homeland.

At the same time, there were also shortcomings in the intelligence work. In particular, the quality of intelligence information does not yet fully meet today's requirements. This is primarily due to insufficient operational capabilities in the most important targets for reconnaissance penetration. Another pressing issue is increasing the efficiency of active exploration activities and acquiring new reliable channels for their implementation.

The Committee's counterintelligence activities were aimed at suppressing attempts by enemy intelligence services and anti-socialist elements to use for subversive purposes the expansion of international cooperation, the processes of renewal in the country, and serious difficulties in interethnic relations, the economy and other spheres of life of Soviet society.

Counterintelligence operated in the context of a significant expansion of contacts between the USSR and the USA and other NATO countries... Among the citizens of NATO countries who visited Soviet defense facilities, about a third were intelligence officers.

Intelligence officers from NATO countries working in the USSR under the cover of diplomats and journalists made 2,267 trips around the country (1,478 in 1988). State security agencies stopped more than 200 attempts to penetrate military installations. 19 people were expelled from the USSR for illegal activities...

Attempts by a number of Soviet citizens, including military personnel and civilian secret carriers, to proactively establish contact with foreign intelligence services for criminal purposes were prevented.

The fight against terrorism has been intensified, and 384 members of international terrorist organizations have been prevented from entering the country. Based on reliable data on involvement in such organizations, 899 foreigners were placed under entry control. 130 citizens of the USSR were taken under control in connection with statements of terrorist intentions. Three attempts to hijack and hijack passenger planes abroad were foiled. The behavior of 140 citizens who expressed intentions to hijack aircraft was monitored.

Much attention was paid to preventing the leakage of data to the enemy about the most important weapons programs and other state secrets, his misinformation on these issues, and the diversion of attention and efforts to false targets. At the same time, significant adjustments have been made to the organization of secret protection... They (state departments of the USSR - O.Kh.) were provided with the necessary assistance in the work of declassifying documents and removing unjustified restrictions.

In the economic sphere, counterintelligence prevented a number of disruptive trade and economic actions. The largest of them is an attempt by foreign companies, through the mediation of the Moscow cooperative "Alkov", the Estonian joint venture "Estek" and other Soviet organizations, to purchase several billion rubles in the USSR at the "black market" rate. The intentions of a number of officials to reveal commercial secrets for personal gain were thwarted. Together with customs authorities, contraband items worth more than 76 million rubles were detained. In the economic zone of the USSR, fines were imposed on foreign ships in the amount of about 1 million foreign currency rubles.

Measures were consistently taken to further improve the operational and staffing structure of the KGB, and to make more rational use of available forces and means. In accordance with the basic principles of building a rule of law state, a Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System was formed in the Committee, and corresponding units were created in local bodies. They got involved in the work to stabilize the situation, especially in the Transcaucasian and Baltic republics, in Moldova and a number of other regions where the most tense situation has recently developed. Much work is being done by these units in Moscow and Leningrad, especially in uncovering and neutralizing subversive actions of foreign intelligence services trying to intensify the activities of extremist organizations. Information work in this area has improved somewhat.

In connection with the increase in crime throughout the country, the Committee more actively used its forces in the fight against its organized forms. A number of successful operations have been carried out against smugglers, corrupt elements, bribe-takers and extortionists. 282 people were brought to criminal responsibility for committing criminal acts as part of organized groups. A significant number of materials on these issues were transferred to the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the prosecutor's office, many activities were carried out jointly with them.

Assessing the results of counterintelligence work, the State Security Committee sees that its effectiveness significantly lags behind the requirements of the situation. The effectiveness of many security measures remains low. The fight against organized crime is still progressing slowly.

Taking into account the situation in the country, the KGB authorities paid main attention to general prevention, strengthening the educational function of the State Security Committee...

Along with preventive work, criminal prosecution measures were used. 338 people were brought to criminal responsibility for especially dangerous, other state and other crimes.

Taking into account the difficult situation in the country, the KGB bodies took the necessary measures to ensure socio-political events, protect the leaders of the party and state, and distinguished foreign guests. Government communications worked steadily.

This text is an introductory fragment. From the author's book

Chapter 2 Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" NPO of the USSR and NKVMF of the USSR Military counterintelligence, by a secret resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, was transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, under which the counterintelligence departments "Smersh" were established

From the author's book

Cleansing. Chairman of the KGB of Azerbaijan After the party congress, the apparatus of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the republic were purged of persons who had compromised themselves during Bagirov’s tenure as 1st Secretary of the Central Committee. The situation during this period was extremely

From the author's book

Chapter 2 Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" NPO of the USSR and NKVMF of the USSR Military counterintelligence, by a secret resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, was transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, under which counterintelligence departments were established

From the author's book

No. 3 FROM A REPORT OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR TO THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated August 28, 1939. From Paris they tell us the following data from August 23 about Hitler's negotiations with the British: “Halifax and the British ambassador in Berlin have been invited to Hitler for important negotiations. They received instructions -

From the author's book

No. 7 FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE NKGB OF THE USSR TO THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the NGOs of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR dated March 6, 1941. Message from BerlinAccording to information received from an official of the Committee on the Four-Year Plan, several committee workers received an urgent task to make calculations of raw material reserves And

From the author's book

No. 8 FROM THE REPORT OF THE NKGB OF THE USSR TO THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated March 11, 1941. March 6 of this year. British Ambassador Cripps called a press conference, which was attended by British and American correspondents Chollerton, Lovell, Cassidy, Duranty, Shapiro and Magidov.

From the author's book

No. 9 NOTE OF THE USSR People's Commissar of State Security V.N. MERKULOV TO THE Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars and the NKVD of the USSR WITH THE TELEGRAM OF THE ENGLISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS A. EDEN TO THE AMBASSADOR OF ENGLAND TO THE USSR S. CRIPPS ABOUT GERMANY'S INTENTIONS TO ATTACK THE USSR No. 1312/M April 26, 1941 Top Secret Directed

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The treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. Military preparation for an attack on the USSR Gentlemen, judges! I now turn to an account of the crimes committed by the Nazi aggressors against my country, against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. June 22

From the author's book

7. TELEGRAM OF THE DEPUTY PEOPLE’S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.P. POTEMKIN TO THE PLENIFYED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR IN THE CHSR S.S. ALEXANDROVSKY Moscow, September 20, 19381. To Benes' question whether the USSR, according to the treaty, would provide immediate and effective assistance to Czechoslovakia,

From the author's book

11. NOTE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR M. M. LITVINOV TO THE AMBASSADOR OF GERMANY TO THE USSR F. VON SCHULENBURG Moscow, March 18, 1939 Mr. Ambassador, I have the honor to confirm receipt of your note dated the 16th and note dated the 17th of this month, notifying the Soviet government of the inclusion of the Czech Republic

From the author's book

9. Telegram of the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Molotov to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in the Kingdom of Romania A. I. Lavrentiev on the return of Bessarabia on June 27, 1940. June 2, I called Davidesk and handed it the next statement of the Soviet government. “In 1918,“ In 1918

From the author's book

5. REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL GOLIKOV, TO THE USSR NGO, SNK USSR AND THE CPSU (B) Central Committee “STATEMENTS, [ORGANIZATIONAL EVENTS] AND OPTIONS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMY AGAINST THE USSR” March 20, 1941 Most of the intelligence data concerning

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Part II Chairman of the KGB of the USSR And you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free The inscription on the CIA coat of arms in the central hall of the headquarters of this organization in Langley (USA, District of Columbia) “... Impartial history will pronounce its verdict, more lenient than

From the author's book

Red Chairman Ernest Wohlweber was born in 1898 in Hanover-Münden. His parents were working people and held leftist views. So it’s no coincidence that immediately after graduating from school, when Ernest went to work as a loader at the port, he joined

Sergei ZHIRNOV, former senior officer of the illegal intelligence of the PGU KGB of the USSR and the SVR of the Russian Federation

WHERE WAS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND WHERE WAS PUTIN?
(Putin never served in the foreign intelligence service of the KGB of the USSR)

After Putin and a group of security officers came to power with him, the most idiotic and persistent myths began to circulate among the people about his imaginary membership in foreign intelligence (although it is documented, including from Putin’s own memoirs, that he was never in foreign intelligence served) and about an allegedly brilliant career there, launched in the media by Kremlin PR people on the eve of the “election” to the post of President of the Russian Federation in the spring of 2000.

I often get asked a question about Putin’s real place in the KGB hierarchy and in intelligence before the collapse of the USSR. Therefore, I decided to finally draw up a kind of table of prestige ranks within the KGB, so that anyone, even someone not very privy to the secrets of the KGB, could clearly figure out for themselves who and where on this ladder was in Soviet times.

The KGB of the USSR in the late Andropov era (after 1978) had the status of an autonomous union State Committee with the rights of a union-republican ministry and officially numbered about 400 thousand employees (including about 100 thousand - border troops, then also KGB troops, special forces and a whole army of civilians and servants, personnel officers there were something like 100-200 thousand, it is impossible to determine more precisely, because the KGB always hid its numbers). At the same time, this arithmetic did not take into account the huge secret apparatus of “voluntary assistants” or “informers” (agents, trusted connections and proxies) - about 5 million Soviet and foreign citizens.

Of course, even these 400 thousand KGB employees from the 260 million population of the USSR are a drop in the ocean. There was one KGB officer for every 600 Soviet citizens. And if we take only career operative officers, there was one operative for every 1200-1400 citizens of the USSR. Therefore, the security officers, of course, arithmetically fell under the concept of rarity, the elite, the “cream” of society.

This is the security elite of the Soviet people (along with other elites - party, state, Komsomol, trade union, military, diplomatic, foreign trade, journalist, scientific, artistic, creative, writer, thieves, intellectual, religious and the like). Getting into it was considered very difficult and already a very honorable thing. Therefore, in itself, belonging to the closed and prestigious KGB corporation was considered enviable for the overwhelming majority of Soviet people.

Did Putin serve in the elite KGB corporation? Definitely yes. Did Putin serve in intelligence? For some time and conditionally, but internally. Did Putin serve in foreign intelligence? Never in my life! Putin’s career in the table of ranks of prestige of the KGB operational staff is expressed by the following numbers: 43-42-39-34-31-34-26-39. And it requires some explanation (you will find it below). Was Putin's career in the KGB bright and successful? Compared to two thirds of the security officers - yes. But compared to real employees of real foreign intelligence - no.

Inside the “elite” KGB corporation itself, there was a multi-stage ladder of success for the operational personnel - various individual elites, which looks something like this (the prestige in it decreases as you go down from the first to the forty-third position):

TABLE ON THE RANKS OF PRESTIGE OF THE USSR KGB OPERATIONAL STAFF
__________________________
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
__________________________
ILLEGAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

1. illegal intelligence officer “in the field” (operator of the “Special Reserve” of the KGB of the USSR), on a long trip abroad (DZK) in a developed capital country of the “first grade”, the Western world (USA, England, France, Germany, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, Spain, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, South Africa, Israel, etc.)
2. illegal intelligence officer of the Center (operator of the active reserve of the KGB of the USSR “under the roof” or the 1st department of the central apparatus of illegal intelligence (directorate “C”)), constantly and regularly traveling “to the field” on short-term business trips and on individual, one-time illegal assignments around the world
3. illegal intelligence officer “in the field” (operator of the “Special Reserve” of the KGB of the USSR), in the DZK in a “second-class” country, in the most developed of the so-called developing countries of capitalist orientation (Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Hong Kong, South Korea, Brazil, India, Kenya, Turkey, Morocco, Latin American, Arab, African countries, Southeast Asian countries) or an officer of the “Special Reserve” for settlement or legalization in an intermediate country
4. an officer of department “C”, who is undergoing special training to become illegal immigrants through the 3rd department or a candidate for enrollment as an illegal immigrant
5. special purpose officer (special forces) of the special unit "Vympel" of the 8th department of directorate "C" (sabotage, sabotage, terrorism, guerrilla and raid warfare deep behind enemy lines in any country in the world)
__________________________
"LEGAL" FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

6. an operative of a “legal” residency in a DZK in a developed country of the Western world, working “in the field” through illegal intelligence (“N”) or an operative of the active KGB reserve “under the roof” in civilian ministries, departments, institutions and organizations in the USSR in preparation for the DZK (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade, State Committee for Science and Technology, State Committee for Economic Relations, TASS, State Television and Radio Broadcasting, APN, mass media, etc.)
7. an operative officer of a “legal” residency in a DZK in a developed country of the Western world, working “in the field” along the line of political intelligence (PR) or an operative officer of the active KGB reserve “under the roof” in an institution in the USSR in preparation for a DZK along this line
8. an operative of a “legal” residency in a DZK in a developed country of the Western world, working “in the field” through scientific and technical intelligence (“X”) or external counterintelligence (“KR”) or an operative of the active KGB reserve “under the roof” in an institution in the USSR in preparation for DZK along this line
9. an operational “legal” employee of the central apparatus of illegal intelligence (directorate “C”), who regularly goes “to the field” on one-time “legal” special missions around the world
10. operational “legal” employee of the prestigious geographical departments of the PSU or the “T” and “K” departments of the central office (PGU), who regularly goes “to the field” on one-time “legal” special assignments around the world
11. an operative officer of a “legal” residency in a DZK in a developing capitalist-oriented country, working “in the field” through illegal intelligence (“N”) or an operative officer of the active KGB reserve “under the roof” in an institution in the USSR in preparation for a DZK
12. an operative officer of a “legal” residency in a DZK in a developing country with a capitalist orientation, working “in the field” through political intelligence (“PR”) or an operative officer of the active KGB reserve “under the roof” in an institution in the USSR in preparation for a DZK
13. an operative of a “legal” residency in a DZK in a developing capitalist-oriented country, working “in the field” through scientific and technical intelligence (“X”) and external counterintelligence (“KR”) or an operative of the active KGB reserve “under the roof” in an institution in the USSR in preparation for the DZK
14. an operational officer of the central apparatus of illegal intelligence (directorate “C”, Yasenevo), working at the Center in a prestigious geographical department within illegal intelligence (4th or 5th)
15. an officer of the central apparatus of foreign intelligence (PGU, Yasenevo) of the KGB, working in the Center in the prestigious geographical department of the entire PGU (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th or 7th)
16. an operational officer of the central apparatus of management "T" or management "K" (Yasenevo), working at the Center in the prestigious geographical department of his department
17. an operational officer of the central apparatus of illegal intelligence, working in the Center in a low-prestige geographical, functional or auxiliary department (2, 3, 6, 7 and 8 departments of management “C”)
18. an operational officer of the central apparatus of foreign intelligence (PGU in Yasenevo), working at the Center in a low-prestige geographical department of the PGU (for example, English-speaking or French-speaking countries of Africa, near-socialist countries of Southeast Asia)
19. an officer of the central apparatus of the departments “T” and “K” of foreign intelligence (PGU), working in the Center in a low-prestige geographical, functional or auxiliary department of his department, or an employee of a low-prestige department or service of the PGU (NTO, legal service, archives, NIIRP ), or CI teacher
20. student of the Basic (three-year) faculty of the KI KGB of the USSR (official diploma of the USSR of a unified state standard for second higher education).
21. student of the two-year faculty of the KGB USSR CI (internal KGB certificate of advanced training).
_________________________
OTHER EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES OF THE KGB IN CAPITAL COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING CAPITALIST-ORIENTED COUNTRIES AND IN "HOT SPOTS"

22. an operative of other lines of the KGB, working in a subsidiary control department in a developed country of the Western world (security officer, cryptographer, operational driver, scientific and technical support technician, etc.)
23. an operative of other lines of the KGB, working in a DZK in a developing country with a capitalist orientation (security officer, cryptographer, NTO technician, etc.) or a “legal” and official adviser to the KGB in “hot spots” (Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Afghanistan , Syria, Libya, Iraq, Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam, etc.)
_________________________
_________________________

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCE (INTELLIGENCE FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR, COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIETAL BLACK COUNTRIES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF SOCIALIST ORIENTATION) AND OTHER INTERNAL ACTIVITIES OF THE KGB

24. operative officer of the central official representative office of the KGB in the capital of the socialist country in the DZK, working through illegal intelligence
25. officer of the central official representative office of the KGB in the capital of the socialist country in the DZK, working through internal intelligence from the territory of the socialist countries and other lines of KGB activity
26. operative officer of the official representative office of the KGB in the socialist country in the DZK, working through internal intelligence in the provincial branch (intelligence point in the socialist countries)
27. operative of various lines of the KGB in the DZK in the socialist country, working in the province or in the group of Soviet troops (GSV)
28. an operative officer of the 11th department of the PGU (internal intelligence from the territory of socialist countries) or an operative officer of the active reserve of the KGB of the USSR “under the roof” of Soviet external organizations (SSOD, KMO USSR, Peace Committee, Soviet Women's Committee, Olympic Committee, etc. )
29. operational officer of the central apparatus of the RT in Moscow (internal intelligence from the territory, the first line of activity of the territorial bodies of the KGB)
30. operational officer of the first department (internal intelligence from the territory in the structure of the territorial bodies of the KGB) of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region
31. student of one-year courses at the Andropov Red Banner Institute of the KGB of the USSR (KGB certificate of advanced training for internal intelligence from the territory of the USSR and socialist countries)
32. operational officer of the central apparatus of the KGB of the USSR (second main board and other departments) in Moscow
33. first-line operative (internal intelligence from the territory of the USSR) of the regional departments of the KGB in Moscow and the Moscow region
34. an officer of the first departments (internal intelligence from the territory, the first line of KGB activity) of the republican, regional or regional apparatus of the KGB in the capital of one of the 14 union republics or in a large provincial city and/or a major seaport (Leningrad, Klaipeda, Riga, Vladivostok, Odessa, Novorossiysk, Sevastopol, Batumi, Murmansk, etc.) or an employee of the active reserve “under the roof” in civil organizations
35. operational officer of the central apparatus of the republican, regional and regional KGB of the USSR (counterintelligence, etc.)
36. first-line operational officer (internal intelligence from the territory) of the regional departments of the KGB in the capital of one of the 14 union republics or in a large provincial city and/or a major seaport (Leningrad, Klaipeda, Riga, Vladivostok, Odessa, Novorossiysk, Sevastopol, Batumi, Murmansk and etc.)
37. operative officer of the first departments (internal intelligence from the territory, the first line of KGB activity) of the regional apparatus of the KGB for the non-prestigious regions of the RSFSR and union republics
38. first-line operative (internal intelligence from the territory) of regional departments of the KGB in non-prestigious regions of the RSFSR and union republics
39. an officer of other lines (general, military, economic, transport, ideological counterintelligence, etc.) of the KGB in the capital of one of the 14 union republics or in a large provincial city or a major seaport (Leningrad, Vladivostok, Odessa, Novorossiysk, Murmansk, etc.)
40. an operational officer of other lines (general, military, economic, transport, ideological counterintelligence, etc.) in territorial bodies (district departments) in the province or a career border guard officer
41. Cadet of the Higher Red Banner and Dzerzhinsky School of the KGB of the USSR (counterintelligence, diploma of first higher education) or student of the Higher Courses of the KGB
42. student of operational courses of the KGB of the USSR (certificate of advanced training) or cadet of a border school
43. non-certified (civilian) employee of the KGB of the USSR or a long-term conscript, or a contract soldier

________________________

EXPLANATIONS AND NOTES

(strong request: do not engage in meaningful discussions with me without carefully reading and understanding all of this):

1. In the KGB of the USSR, according to the geographical principle, there were two completely different and incomparable intelligence services: external (real - in developed Western countries and in the most developed of the so-called developing countries) and internal (surrogate - intelligence from the territory of the USSR, socialist countries and poor satellite countries )

2. Accordingly, there were significant differences in the prestige of the position within the KGB and outside it - in the rest of Soviet society. Thus, in the USSR it was generally considered prestigious to go to any “abroad” (even to such backward and poor socialist countries as Mongolia, Romania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Syria or North Korea), and within the KGB, neither many developing countries, nor, especially, socialist, were not considered prestigious at all. Even capitalist countries like Finland. Because of this difference in perception between intelligence professionals and ordinary laymen, the latter think that Putin’s business trip to the GDR is a career success, although in reality it was considered at PGU as ending up in a landfill or in a garbage pit.

3. My table of prestige ranks applies exclusively to the operational, but not to the commanding staff of the KGB.

4. The structure of this table is only quantitatively pyramidal. That is, the lower categories are much more numerous (tens of thousands) than the higher ones (only a few hundred and tens of people). But they have no official dependence on each other.

5. The transition of an operational employee to the management team could significantly change his prestige, but this is outside the presented report card, because it becomes too difficult (impossible) for an objective assessment. What is better and more prestigious: to be a simple lieutenant in an “illegal” foreign intelligence station in Paris or Washington, or a general in some provincial “Uryupinsk” at the head of the regional KGB department?

6. In the KGB of the USSR, the operational staff could grow from a junior lieutenant to a lieutenant colonel (in rank) and from a junior intelligence officer to a senior assistant to the head of a department (in rank). Up to and including lieutenant colonel, ranks were assigned by internal orders of the chairman of the KGB of the USSR. Already in the GDR, Putin reached the limit of automatic growth of the operational staff within the KGB (lieutenant colonel, senior assistant to the head of the department) and would never have been able to rise higher (he was old and did not have the necessary education and qualifications for further growth), even if he really wanted to.

7. Starting with the colonel, the procedure changed, becoming radically more complicated, making it accessible to units. The assignment of military ranks, starting with colonel, fell into the nomenclature of the CPSU Central Committee. In this case, the following were required: successful completion of management courses (in Moscow at the CI or in Alma-Ata), representation by the Collegium and the Chairman of the KGB and approval in the Department of Administrative Bodies of the Central Committee apparatus, and the assignment itself was made by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

8. It is very important not to confuse the prestige of a position in this table of ranks with profitability or material benefits. For example, a simple cryptographer working in a DZK in the most crooked country and receiving foreign currency was financially much better off than any of the most prestigious officers in Yasenevo. So the senior intelligence officer, Major Putin, being in the DZK at a provincial point of internal intelligence from the territory of the socialist countries in Dresden (GDR), received more (in 4 years he saved up for a new Volga) than the colonel of the most prestigious department of real foreign intelligence (PGU), but on This material side of the matter was where his advantages ended.

9. It must be said that full training at the KGB Intelligence Institute (CI) was not mandatory for working in “internal” intelligence - in surrogate intelligence from the territory, in the first line of the territorial bodies of the KGB in the USSR and socialist countries. For this, six-month advanced training courses in Kyiv, Gorky, a year in Minsk or at the CI in Moscow were enough. Therefore, when Putin went to a one-year course in Moscow, it was already clear from the very beginning that his personnel officers did not plan to join any foreign intelligence service. That’s why he later returned to St. Petersburg and went only to the GDR, to the official representation of the KGB under the Stasi, where real intelligence officers were practically not sent at the beginning of their careers.

10. Putin began his career in the KGB (from 1975 to 1991) from the lowest 43rd position (a civilian employee of the secretariat, an uncertified legal adviser of the Leningrad KGB), then rose to 42nd. For most of his career in the KGB, he was in the territorial bodies of the KGB in provincial Leningrad in the 39th position out of 43 in my table of prestige ranks in the KGB, gradually moving to 34th position (internal intelligence from the territory of the USSR in Leningrad). For 9 months before leaving for the GDR, he moved to Moscow to the 31st position, and then very briefly (for four months) back to Leningrad to the 34th position. During the DZK in the GDR (1986-1990), Putin temporarily rose to 26th position, and this was his highest achievement in the structure of the KGB of the USSR. Immediately after returning from the GDR (1990-1991), he moved back to Leningrad to 39th position.

11. The fact that Putin ended up as President of the Russian Federation is completely unrelated to his non-existent “successes” in the KGB and, moreover, in “foreign intelligence”, in which he never served (it starts from the 21st position and higher in table of prestige ranks). He simply turned out to be in the right place at the right time: in 1991-95 (under Sobchak in the St. Petersburg mayor's office) and then in 1997-99 (in the administration of President Yeltsin). Yeltsin's "family" and a group of oligarchs led by Berezovsky, mistakenly assessing Putin's dullness and diligence as his main advantage, made their main bet in an attempt to preserve the elusive power on him, as a puppet at the highest post in the state. And over time he abandoned them all. That's all the explanation. It has nothing to do with Putin’s “merits” in the KGB.

12. Personally, I immediately started in the KGB from the 4th position (1981-82), but then I proactively refused to complete special training and enlist as an illegal immigrant in the KGB (2nd position). After a forced return to the issue of personnel service in the KGB, I had to fall far down - all the way to 20th position (1984-87)! Thus, personally, my lowest point in the table of prestige ranks in the KGB (20th) was six positions higher than Putin’s highest (26th)! Moreover, we never served in the same intelligence service: I was always in the real external intelligence service, and he was in the surrogate, internal intelligence service, and even then not always. Then I managed to immediately rise sharply to the 14th position (1987-1988), and from there I returned to the top again - to my original one, where I started, 4th (1988-89), with a loss of 6 years. And then to the 2nd (1989-91). Well, I ended my operational career in 1992 in the highest 1st position. After the destruction of the USSR and the liquidation of the KGB, I proactively retired, first to the reserves, and then finally retired from the spy agency, which I never regretted before and do not regret now (Read the autobiographical novel “How the KGB Hunted Me”).

Paris, March 2016.

The KGB of the USSR is the strongest body that controlled state security during the Cold War. The influence of this institution in the USSR was so great that almost the entire population of the state feared it. Few people know that the KGB of the USSR operated in the security system.

History of the creation of the KGB

The USSR state security system was created already in the 1920s. As you know, this machine almost immediately began working in full mode. It is enough to recall only the repressions that were carried out in the USSR in the 30s of the 20th century.

All this time, until 1954, state security bodies existed within the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Of course, organizationally this was absolutely wrong. In 1954, two decisions were made by the highest authorities concerning the state security system. On February 8, by decree of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, security agencies were removed from the subordination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Already on March 13, 1954, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, by its decree, created the USSR State Security Committee. In this form, this body existed right up until the collapse of the USSR.

KGB leaders

Over the years, the organ was led by Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, Vitaly Vasilyevich Fedorchuk.

Functions of the KGB

The general essence of the activities of this body is clear, but not all the tasks of the security agencies that they performed in the system of the totalitarian regime for many years are known to a wide range of the population. Therefore, we will outline the main range of functions of the KGB:

• the most important task was considered to be the organization of intelligence activities in capitalist countries;
• fight against spies from foreign intelligence agencies on the territory of the USSR;
• work to counter possible leakage of data that is important to the state in all areas of activity;
• protection of state facilities, borders and major political figures;
• ensuring the smooth operation of the state apparatus.

Directorates of the KGB of the USSR

The State Security Committee had a complex structure, consisting of headquarters, directorates and departments. I would like to dwell on the KGB departments. So, there were 9 divisions:

1. The Third Directorate was responsible for military counterintelligence. In those years, the relevance of management tasks was enormous due to the active arms race between the USSR and the USA. Although war was not officially declared, the threat of the systems conflict going from “cold” to “hot” was constant.
2. The fifth division was responsible for political and ideological issues. Ensuring ideological security and the non-penetration of ideas “hostile” to communism among the masses is the main task of this structure.
3. The Sixth Directorate was responsible for maintaining state security in the economic sphere.
4. The seventh performed a specific task. When suspicions of serious misconduct fell on a certain person, surveillance could be placed on him.
5. The ninth division protected the personal safety of members of the government, the highest party leadership.
6. Operations and technical department. During the years of scientific and technological revolution, technology was constantly developing, so the security of the state could be reliably protected only with good technical equipment of the relevant bodies.
7. The tasks of the fifteenth department included the protection of government buildings and strategically important objects.
8. The sixteenth division was engaged in electronic intelligence. It was created already in the last period of the existence of the USSR in connection with the development of computer technology.
9. Construction department for the needs of the Ministry of Defense.

Departments of the KGB of the USSR

Departments are smaller, but no less important structures of the Committee. From the time of its creation until the dissolution of the KGB of the USSR, there were 5 departments. Let's talk about them in more detail.

The investigative department was involved in the investigation of crimes of a criminal or economic nature aimed at violating the security of the state. In the context of confrontation with the capitalist world, it was important to ensure absolute secrecy of government communications. This was done by a special unit.

The KGB had to employ qualified employees who had undergone special training. This is precisely why the KGB Higher School was created.

In addition, special departments were created to organize wiretapping of telephone conversations, as well as in premises; to intercept and process suspicious correspondence. Of course, not all conversations were listened to and not all letters were read, but only when suspicions arose regarding a citizen or group of people.

Separately, there were special border troops (PV KGB of the USSR), which were engaged in protecting the state border.

Lieutenant General Vakulchik Valery Pavlovich

In 1985 he graduated from the Kharkov Guards Higher Tank Command School. In 1992 - Higher courses of military counterintelligence of the KGB of the USSR. In 2011 - Academy of Management under the President of the Republic of Belarus.

From 1985 to 1991 he served in the Armed Forces. From 1991 to 2008 he served in state security agencies. Since May 2008 - Head of the Operational and Analytical Center under the President of the Republic of Belarus.

Since October 2011 - Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Republic of Belarus.

Appointed Chairman of the State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus on November 16, 2012 by Decree of the President of the Republic of Belarus No. 511.

Awarded the Order of the Fatherland, III degree, and 11 medals.

Deputy Chairmen of the KGB

First
Major General Terebov Sergey Evgenievich

Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus
Major General Kalach Vladimir Viktorovich

Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus
Major General Tertel Ivan Stanislavovich

Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus
Major General Chernyshev Oleg Anatolyevich

Heads of regional departments and Department of Internal Affairs of the KGB

Head of the KGB department for Minsk and the Minsk region
Colonel Reutsky Dmitry Vasilievich

Head of the KGB department for the Brest region
Major General Gladyshev Sergei Sergeevich

Head of the KGB department for the Vitebsk region
Colonel Stolyarchuk Oleg Valerievich

Head of the KGB department for the Gomel region
Colonel Melnikov Alexander Kuzmich

Head of the KGB department for the Grodno region
Major General Alexander Viktorovich Neverovsky

Head of the KGB department for the Mogilev region
Major General Terekhov Alexander Alexandrovich

Head of the KGB military counterintelligence department
Major General Kuchinsky Konstantin Anatolyevich

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